Fichte wanted to give to concept of formation the universal importance, but it was for this purpose necessary to eliminate "an inert element" in the system, namely "antisituation to formation", "object" that led to destruction of dialectics of consciousness, disappearance of reality I. Therefore he had to assume constantly that every time the steady nature in itself has to resist to "victorious procession of spirit".
At Fichte activity stops in a product (therefore natural subjects appear at it only passive "objects"), and at Schelling only fades again to quicken in it already in a new form and further to be continued and postponed for the following product, etc.
As Fichte had no immanent consideration of the nature, he also could not comprehend it from this its active party. The nature is for it something once and forever stiffened, unconditional contrast of activity (subject, "object", and for Schelling - the amateur performance which only hid and ready to ignite again, to revive in new forms. According to Schelling everything in the nature opens itself through contrast: the general - through special, a producing - through a product. The nature itself conducts the product through contrasts and at the highest top subjects it in initial identity where conflict of opposites "fades". Such it also has to be presented in that point of the development where its activity is already postponed for a new product, for the person whereas at this top of development it expresses herself the fikhteansky formulation:" I am only activity, and anything more", i.e. initially, in pure form, in essence the nature is activity, and this its general definiteness is most universally presented in a special product of the nature, in the person. However Fichte put some other sense in the words "I am Activity": he meant already understanding himself, subjective I for which the nature became not - I, object.
According to Fichte, the nature only "negative", and according to Schelling, it something positive. Both thinkers call physiophilosophy and transcendental philosophy contrasts, but exactly here they their views disperse: according to Fichte the contrast is that the philosophy can be only a naukoucheniye, but not physiophilosophy, and according to Schelling that and another make two poles of one philosophy. all system of philosophy, claims Schelling, finds end "in two main sciences, is mutual itself filling and each other demanding, despite the contrast in principle and orientations".
At Fichte I do the nature by contrast to, Schelling has a nature itself own development turns itself contrary to itself: formation - in become, unconscious - in understanding himself.
That contrast I which at Fichte joins to I "the logical act in the form of the antithesis existing near the thesis" at Schelling is developed in process. He seeks to show how the contrast becomes contrast.
Schelling, having rejected fikhteansky panegoism, tried to develop from positions of objective idealism the doctrine about an origin of human intelligence by development of "an unconscious spiritual pervonachal" which neither subject, nor object, and them "initial absolute identity" is not. In the physiophilosophy he stated many dialectic ideas and for the first time in the history of philosophy tried (from positions idealism to give a complete systematic picture of development of the nature.
So, according to Schelling the nature does not need "investment with her soul": the soul in it is, and the soul is own essence of the nature. This "idealism of the nature" and her dialectician connected in Schelling's doctrine by no means not in a random way. If the nature is dead, "callous" if it only "object" also is absolutely deprived of "subjectivity" (internal activity), Fichte is right: it is not dialectic. And vice versa: if it dialectically develops, means in it there lives "soul", her internal "master". It turns out that if the nature bears in itself the same beginning which is made by me in the person if in it the same principle is shown, as in an inner world, it is possible to apply the dialectic analysis to it (fikhteanskiya, naturally, transformed since Fichte's system as it was already told, imposed a ban on consideration of the nature in such a key.